Gendered Nationalism:The Gender Gap in Support for the Scottish National Party by Johns, Robert et al.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gendered Nationalism
Citation for published version:
Johns, R, Bennie, L & Mitchell, J 2012, 'Gendered Nationalism: The Gender Gap in Support for the Scottish
National Party' Party Politics, vol 18, no. 4, pp. 581-601., 10.1177/1354068810386839
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1177/1354068810386839
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Author final version (often known as postprint)
Published In:
Party Politics
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Johns, R., Bennie, L., & Mitchell, J. (2012). Gendered Nationalism: The Gender Gap in Support for the
Scottish National Party. Party Politics, 18(4), 581-601. 10.1177/1354068810386839
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 20. Feb. 2015
 1
Gendered nationalism: 
Women and the Scottish National Party 
 
James Mitchell, Robert Johns and Lynn Bennie 
(Strathclyde and Aberdeen Universities) 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Scholars exploring the basis of support for political parties have typically looked to social and 
economic factors, pre-eminently class and religion.  However, this approach has enjoyed only 
limited success when applied to ethno-regionalist parties in general (De Winter and Cachafeiro, 
2002) and to the Scottish National Party (SNP) in particular.  The nationalist basis of SNP 
support is unmistakable: those who feel Scottish rather than British and those who share the 
party’s commitment to independence are much more likely to support the SNP.  Yet Scottish 
identity and support for independence tend to cut across the traditional cleavages and so analyses 
of the SNP vote have tended to emphasise heterogeneity, with researchers remarking on the 
party’s ability to win support across social groups (Miller, 1981; McCrone, 1992: 164-66; 
Paterson, 2006).  Furthermore, the few patterns that did distinguish SNP electoral support, such 
as relative strength among younger voters and relative weakness among Catholics (Kendrick, 
1983; Bennie et al., 1997, ch. 8), are gradually being eroded.  In the 2007 Scottish Parliament 
election, when the SNP became the largest party in Scotland for the first time, its support was 
even more than usually drawn from across the social and economic board (Johns et al., 2009).  
 
However, one socio-demographic variable is strongly associated with SNP support.  That 
variable is gender.1  There is a marked gender gap in SNP voting.  In 2007, the SNP won 35% of 
men’s but only 27% of women’s regional votes (Johns et al., 2009, ch. 2), and similar differences 
have been observed at most previous elections.  Meanwhile, the SNP’s membership is even more 
disproportionately male.  According to a recent survey, only 32% of SNP members are women.  
Both of these gender imbalances are pronounced relative to those of other parties, both in the UK 
and elsewhere.  While unusually broad in traditional social and economic terms, the SNP’s 
support is unusually concentrated in terms of gender.  The ‘maleness’ of the SNP is doubly 
noteworthy given that the party has historically had a reasonable record in terms of the 
representation of women – at least compared with other parties in Scotland – amongst its senior 
office-holders and in publicly-elected posts. 
 
The gender gap in SNP support constitutes something of a puzzle, then, and our purpose here is 
to work towards solving that puzzle.2  The empirical bases of the paper are two major pieces of 
                                                 
1 In this paper we will generally refer to that variable as ‘gender’ rather than ‘sex’ (although both will be used in a 
bid to avoid constant repetition).  This is not strictly consistent with our data given that both of the surveys used ask 
about respondents’ sex.  However, the key theoretical arguments concern gender rather than sex differences, and in 
any case the term ‘gender gap’ is ubiquitous in this branch of electoral research. 
2 The paper is thus a response to Grofman’s call for ‘Political Science as Puzzle-Solving’.  As he asserts, ‘A key task 
for empirically oriented social scientists is to find interesting features of the world and try to tell us something 
insightful that will help us to explain/understand them better’ (2001, 1). 
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survey research: the 2007 Scottish Election Study (SES) and, later that same year, a survey of the 
entire SNP membership (detailed methodological information about both surveys is provided in 
Appendix 1).  In the two main sections of the paper, we use these survey data to explore possible 
reasons for the gender gaps in voting and membership respectively.  The striking consistency of 
findings across the two surveys allows us, in the concluding section, to offer a parsimonious 
explanation for the party’s gendered appeal.  
 
 
2. The gender gap in SNP voting 
 
In 2007, the SNP became the largest party in Scotland for the first time.  Between the 2003 and 
2007 Scottish Parliament elections the SNP gained ten percentage points on the regional list vote 
and nine points in the constituency votes.  Beyond the shift in overall vote shares, another 
striking difference between those two elections concerns the gender basis of SNP support.  
According to survey data collected at the two elections, the party drew support fairly evenly from 
both sexes in 2003.  By stark contrast, as noted at the outset, there was an eight-point gender gap 
in 2007: men were markedly more likely to vote for the SNP.  In other words, the gains made 
between 2003 and 2007 were made disproportionately among men.  However, when those two 
elections are seen in broader historical perspective, it is 2003 rather than 2007 that represents the 
exception: the tendency for the SNP to appeal more to men than women has emerged persistently 
in studies of the Scottish electorate (Miller, 1981: 147-8; Paterson, 2006).  This point is 
illustrated in Table 2, which shows the proportion of male and female voters choosing the SNP at 
various elections – both to the Westminster and Scottish Parliaments – since October 1974.3   
 
Table 1 
Percentage SNP voting by sex, October 1974-May 2007 
 
  1974  1979 1992 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 
 (Oct.) Reg. Con. Reg. Con. Reg. Con. 
Male   20.2 23.5 24.3 31.0 32.8 21.9 21.4 23.7 20.0 35.2 37.6 
Female  14.4 19.5 19.5 23.6 24.6 18.3 20.4 23.9 15.4 26.9 28.2 
Gender gap  5.8 4.0 4.8 7.3 8.2 3.7 1.0 -0.3 4.6 8.3 9.3 
             
N Male  342 372 321 505 512 228 385 404 311 578 577 
N Female   366 429 376 533 555 291 458 482 418 597 599 
Sources: British Election Studies 1974-2005; Scottish Social Attitudes 1999 and 2003; Scottish 
Election Study 2007 
 
This gender gap is wide in comparative terms.  Although there is considerable variation across 
countries and across time, gender differences in voting behaviour are typically modest, and in 
some countries more or less non-existent (Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Studlar et al., 1998; Jelen 
et al., 1994; Mayer and Smith, 1985).  Among exceptions, probably the most prominent is the 
USA.  In the 2008 presidential election, for example, 56% of women but only 49% of men voted 
                                                 
3 The time series jumps from 1979 to 1992 because in neither 1983 nor 1987 was there a large-sample (N≈1,000) 
survey of Scottish voters. 
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for Barack Obama (Center for American Women and Politics, 2009), a seven-point gap fairly 
typical of the tendency for males to vote disproportionately Republican and females to vote 
disproportionately Democratic (Seltzer et al., 1997). The SNP gender gap is therefore 
comparable in size with the paradigm case in the literature, yet there has been little research 
aimed at explaining it.  We begin such scrutiny in this article.  
 
2.1  Explaining the electoral gender gap 
 
In the absence of previous studies directly addressing this question, we can look to two sources 
for guidance in explaining the SNP’s electoral gender gap.  The first is the recent history of the 
party.  According to leading figures involved in SNP campaigning since devolution, the party 
made strenuous efforts to enhance its appeal to women voters after survey evidence from the 
1999 elections and subsequent opinion polls showed SNP support to be relatively weak in this 
half of the electorate.  There were various aspects to this strategy.  One was an emphasis on 
policy concerns thought to be women’s priorities, such as education and health.  In addition, 
senior women including Nicola Sturgeon and Fiona Hyslop were given more prominent roles in 
the campaign.  John Swinney, SNP leader in 2003, was less combative than his predecessor Alex 
Salmond and was keen to adopt a more women-friendly approach to campaigning.4  The efforts 
to win female votes eased rather, however, when Salmond resumed the leadership in 2004.  
Salmond’s style and priorities differed from his predecessor.  He insisted that an Asian Scot 
should be returned for the SNP in 2007 but set no objective for women’s representation.  The 
result was that the party slipped further away from gender parity in parliamentary representation: 
women comprised 43% of the first cohort of SNP Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs), 
but this had fallen to just 25% by 2007.  The decline reflects not only the absence of mechanisms 
to ensure equality but also the fact that gender equality in representation slipped down the party’s 
agenda. On this reading, leadership, party image, perceived issue priorities and the parliamentary 
representation of women are possible factors determining the gender balance of SNP support.  
However, there are two limitations to this account.  First, it does not account for the enduring 
gender gap – why is it that, as leaders and campaigning styles change, the ‘default’ position 
seems to be a disproportionately male support for the party?  Secondly, as is often the case in 
media (and some academic) treatments of the gender gap (see Miller et al., 1991; Burden, 2008), 
it tends to treat women’s voting behaviour as the phenomenon to be explained.  Yet, as Table 1 
shows, it is the male electorate whose SNP support has fluctuated more. 
 
The second source of guidance is the research literature on gender gaps elsewhere.  This, too, is 
of restricted use for present purposes in that it has often been couched in terms of the left-right 
(or liberal-conservative) spectrum, with differences in voting behaviour attributed to gender 
differences in left-right attitudes or ideology (e.g. Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Campbell, 2004).  
While the SNP has not been silent on left-right matters, these are not of course the party’s raison 
d’être, and voters are much clearer about the party’s nationalist positions and priorities than 
about its left-right stance (Johns et al., 2009, ch. 4).5  But the links between sex and such 
                                                 
4 The party sought to soften its image by using gentler colour schemes in its marketing and campaigning (see, for 
example, the cover of the 2003 manifesto at www.snp.org/node/6679). 
5 Besides, when we compare males’ and females’ voting behaviour in 2007, there is no clear ideological pattern in 
the differences.  Women were rather more likely than men to support the Liberal Democrats, slightly more likely to 
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variables as national identity and constitutional preferences have not been explored in the gender 
gap literature.  This is not to say that that literature offers nothing to this study; in fact it provides 
several useful pointers, in particular concerning issue priorities and value differences, which can 
be applied in the SNP’s case. 
 
Given the quantitative approach taken here, these candidate explanations are operationalised via 
variables measured in the SES surveys.  In order for a given variable to explain the gender gap, it 
needs to be related both to gender and to vote choice and in the same ‘direction’.  For example, 
although support for Alex Salmond is strongly related to support for the SNP, it will only explain 
(at least part of) the gender gap if male voters are disproportionately favourable towards the 
party leader.  It cannot explain the gap if the sexes share more or less the same view of Salmond, 
or if it turns out that women are actually more favourably disposed to him than men.  In that 
latter case, the leadership variable would actually be narrowing or suppressing the gender gap: 
females would be still less likely to vote SNP were it not for their leader.  In the analyses below, 
we examine whether potential explanatory variables fulfil those statistical conditions and how 
controlling for them affects the gender gap. 
 
Two different analytic approaches are used.  First, the explanatory variables are tested one at a 
time, in each case measuring the gender gap net of their effect.  Second, the variables are added 
cumulatively, in batches, and in approximate causal order based on the ‘funnel of causality’ 
posited by the Michigan scholars (Campbell et al., 1960) and applied to SNP voting by Miller 
(1981).  This model-building approach gives an indication of whether the gender gap remains 
when controlling for multiple variables, and of which types of variable do most to account for it.  
Mention of causality raises a pertinent point about the nature of explanation that can be provided 
by these additional variables.  With the exception of age, sex is causally prior to all of the 
explanatory factors investigated here.  So this is not a case of identifying prior variables that 
generate a spurious relationship between sex and SNP voting.  That relationship is genuine; the 
task here is to identify those intervening variables through which that relationship operates; what 
is it about men that makes them more likely (and about women that makes them less likely) to 
vote for the SNP?  
 
Regardless of analytic approach, the statistical method is the same: logistic regression predicting 
an SNP regional list vote in 2007.6  A baseline model was estimated with gender as the single 
predictor.  This produces the odds ratio associated with the basic gender-vote crosstabulation and 
hence with the ‘gross’ gender gap of 8.3 points.  Re-estimating that model with one or more 
additional predictors is likely to have at least some effect on the odds ratio for gender.  Using the 
marginals from the original crosstabulation, we can reproduce the data that would be required to 
generate this new odds ratio.  Calculating percentages from those new data results in the ‘net’ 
gender gap; that is, the gap controlling for the variable (or variables) added to the model.  The 
basis of the next section of the paper is to gauge changes in the gender gap as different control 
variables are tested.  The results are reported in Table 4. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
support Labour and the Conservatives, and markedly more likely to support one of the various minor parties.  Put 
the other way round, the extra male support for the SNP was drawn from across the ideological spectrum. 
6 In 2007, most constituency seats were not contested by the minor parties.  Here, then, we analyse regional list 
votes because, with more parties on offer, these are probably a truer indication of voters’ preferences. 
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2.2  Testing explanatory variables individually 
 
We begin by testing a series of ‘background’ (i.e. demographic and socioeconomic) variables.  
The first of these is age.  This is unlikely to have a large impact on the gender gap because the 
age profile of male and female voters is not that different.  Longer female life expectancy does, 
however, mean that women are disproportionately represented among older voters.  In previous 
years this might have helped to explain the gender gap, because the SNP surge in the 1970s owed 
much to support from newer voters and the average Nationalist voter was much younger than the 
average voter (Kendrick, 1983).  However, the age gap in SNP voting had more or less closed by 
the 1990s (Paterson, 2006) and in 2007 actually reversed (Johns et al., 2009, ch. 2) such that, like 
women, SNP supporters are slightly older than the average voter.7  The effect of age is thus to 
narrow the gender gap and hence, when that effect is controlled, the gap does indeed widen 
slightly to 9.1 points (see Table 4).  As foreshadowed, this impact is small and controlling for the 
other two background variables, social class and religion, has still less effect on the gender gap.  
Although both show noticeable variations across the sexes, with men substantially more likely to 
be in non-manual work and to disclaim any religious affiliation, neither variable proved more 
than a weak predictor of SNP support in 2007 (Johns et al., ibid.). 
 
Table 2 
Effect of controlling individual variables on the gender gap in SNP voting 
 
                                                 
7 There is evidence in 2007 of a curvilinear relationship between age and SNP voting, with the odds of supporting 
the party increasing until the age of around 70 and then beginning to fall slightly.  To take account of this, the 
analyses reported here includes an age-squared term. 
Individual variable controlled Odds ratio 
Implied 
(male/female SNP) gender gap 
None (baseline) 1.479 8.3 
Background variables   
Age 1.536 9.1 
Religion 1.462 8.1 
Objective social class 1.495 8.6 
Political engagement   
Education 1.490 8.5 
Political interest 1.314 5.8 
Newspaper readership 1.468 8.2 
National identity & constitutional preferences   
National identity 1.669 10.9 
View on more powers for SP 1.634 10.5 
View on fiscal powers for SP 1.475 8.3 
View on independence 1.025 0.5 
View on independence referendum 1.590 9.9 
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Next we deal with three disparate variables gathered under the broad heading of political 
engagement.  Neither education nor newspaper readership has more than a negligible effect on 
the gender gap because, differences across the sexes notwithstanding, neither was more than 
weakly related to SNP voting in 2007.  However, the results with political interest are quite 
different, though.  The politically interested were substantially more likely to be men and also to 
vote SNP.  This variable appears able to account for around one-third of the gender gap, which 
narrows noticeably to 5.8 points when political interest is controlled.  The gender gap in political 
interest is a persistent finding and has a variety of causes (as well as being in part an artefact of 
the standard measures) (Burns et al., 2001, ch. 4; Campbell and Winters, 2008).  Less easily 
explained is the positive association between interest and SNP voting.  However, a comparison 
reveals it to be a phenomenon specific to 2007: in neither 2003 nor 2005 were SNP voters 
Left-right issue positions/priorities   
Increase/reduce taxes and spending 1.477 8.3 
Top issue priority (public services v other) 1.348 6.4 
2007 issues   
Preferred local taxation 1.508 8.8 
View on Iraq and Trident 1.684 11.1 
Leadership   
Evaluation of Alex Salmond 1.299 5.6 
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disproportionately interested in politics.8  The most obvious explanation is that interest is driven 
in quite large part by success.  On this reading, being causally posterior to party choice, interest 
cannot account for gender differences in SNP voting. 
 
Turning now to the specifically Scottish dimension of SNP support, we first consider national 
identity.  Not only has this long been recognised as a key mobiliser in support for the SNP 
(Brand et al., 1994; Paterson, 2006), but it also has prima facie links with gender given that 
national identity is often constructed and expressed in typically masculine contexts such as 
international sport or military history (Cronin and Mayall, 1998; Mayer, 2000).  Some scholars 
(e.g. Stychin, 1998) dismiss such arguments as over-simplistic, however, and the SES evidence 
supports their scepticism.  Women were actually more likely than men (61% compared to 56%) 
to claim Scottishness as their primary identity (when asked to place themselves on a scale 
running from ‘Scottish not British’ to ‘British not Scottish’).  The SNP’s particular appeal to men 
must have some other basis, then, because an appeal based on national identity should have 
particular attraction for female voters.  Indeed, when national identity is controlled, the gender 
gap widens discernibly to 10.9 points. 
    
Recent studies have found that national identity has limited direct impact on SNP support.  
Strong Scottish identifiers support the party because such identity generates support for the 
SNP’s constitutional policies (Johns et al., 2009).  Before we consider the flagship policy of 
independence, it is worth looking at some of the other constitutional options that were on the 
table at the 2007 election.  By some distance the most popular option in 2007 was ‘more 
powers’, and many voters favouring that option voted for the SNP (Johns et al., 2009, ch. 5).  Of 
course, this could only account for the gender gap if men were appreciably keener than women 
to see additional powers transferred to the Scottish Parliament.  That was the case in 1974, prior 
to the 1979 devolution referendum when women were more likely to endorse the constitutional 
status quo.  In contrast, in 2007, the ‘more powers’ option was a little more popular among 
women.  As with national identity, the gender gap would have been even wider (more than ten 
points) had it not been for women’s rather greater appetite for ‘more powers’.  Meanwhile, when 
asked more specifically about the transfer of fiscal powers men and women shared more or less 
identical views.  Overall, then, attitudes to devolution cannot account for the gender gap in SNP 
voting. 
 
With attitudes to independence, however, matters are very different.  When asked how they 
would vote in a straight yes/no referendum on independence, 37% of males but only 26% of 
females answered ‘yes’.9  Since these attitudes were clearly the most powerful predictor of SNP 
voting (Johns et al., 2009), it is not surprising that they go a long way to explaining the gender 
gap in support for the party.  Indeed, once attitudes to independence are controlled, this 
difference narrows almost completely (to 0.5 points, neither substantively nor statistically 
significant).  In short, women are less likely to vote for the SNP because they are less likely to 
support its cornerstone policy of independence.  It is noteworthy that female antipathy to 
                                                 
8 The 2005 data are also drawn from an internet survey and so the SNP-interest association in 2007 is not simply an 
artefact of that mode of survey administration.  
9 Respondents were also asked about their likely referendum vote if a ‘more powers’ option was also available, and 
elsewhere on the survey they ranked a longer list of constitutional options in preference order.  However the 
question was asked, there was at least a ten-point difference between men and women in support for independence. 
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independence did not translate into opposition to the SNP’s promised referendum on 
independence.  Women were slightly more likely to support that proposal.  This may indicate 
that such a referendum was seen more as a safeguard against than as a route to independence.  
Controlling for support for that referendum, the gender gap was slightly wider (9.9 points), 
suggesting that the SNP’s showing among women was indeed improved slightly by their pledge 
to consult the people on independence. 
 
The next set of variables concern the SNP’s issue positions and priorities. First, we analyse 
respondents’ self-placements on a scale running from substantial cuts to substantial increases in 
taxes and spending on public services.  Among the British electorate as a whole, as Campbell 
(2006) shows, the average male voter falls closer to the right-wing end of this scale, and the SES 
results show a similar pattern.  However, this ideological gender gap is narrow.  Moreover, men 
and women alike placed the SNP almost at the exact centre-point of this scale, implying that left-
right ideology plays little part in explaining support for the party and belying any suggestion that 
women were turned off the SNP because it was seen as too right-wing on fiscal policy.  
Hammering the point home, the gender gap of 8.3 points is unaffected by controlling for that 
variable.  On the other hand, the gender gap does narrow somewhat when we turn from issue 
positions to issue priorities.  Respondents were asked an open-ended question about the most 
important issue to them when deciding how to vote in 2007.  Again in line with Campbell’s 
(2006) findings, women were considerably more likely to mention the core public service issues 
of education and health.  Yet these did not tend to be the top priority issues for SNP voters.  
Hence, when we control for issue priorities (via a straightforward ‘public services or not’ 
dichotomous variable), we see the gender gap close to 6.6 points.  In other words, male voters 
responded more positively to the perceived priorities of the SNP.  
 
Beyond the longstanding commitment to independence, the SNP’s most prominent policy 
position in 2007 was a proposal to replace the council tax with a local income tax.  However, 
since this stance was endorsed by the overwhelming majority of both men and women, 
controlling for views on local taxation has virtually no impact on the gender gap.  The SNP was 
also strongly critical of Labour at Westminster’s decisions to go into Iraq and to replace the 
Trident nuclear system, and voters opposed to Iraq and Trident were indeed substantially more 
likely to vote Nationalist.  In line with numerous studies showing that women are less likely (at 
least in Western democracies) to support aggressive foreign policies (Wilcox et al., 1996; 
Eichenberg, 2007), it was female voters who were more likely to share the SNP’s standpoint on 
these issues.  With attitudes to Iraq and Trident controlled, the gender gap widens perceptibly to 
11.1 points, implying again that the SNP’s support would have been still more disproportionately 
male had they taken a different stance on those issues.  
 
The final variable to be considered is evaluations of Alex Salmond, the SNP leader.  The SES 
evidence – from a series of leadership ratings on an 11-point like-dislike scale – bears this out.  
The mean male rating of Salmond was around half a point higher than the mean female rating, a 
difference which appears more substantial in the light of the general tendency for women to 
report more positive evaluations.  All but one of the other politicians included on the survey 
elicited higher mean ratings from female respondents.10  The upshot is that, when leader 
                                                 
10 The other exception, Tommy Sheridan, enjoyed ratings only slightly higher among men than among women.  
Salmond was the only politician rated significantly higher by male respondents. 
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evaluations are controlled, the net gender gap narrows by around one-third.  Three points are 
worth noting about this.  First, since this still leaves a 5.6-point difference, the abrupt reopening 
of the gender gap between 2003 and 2007 cannot simply be attributed to Alex Salmond’s 
resumption of the leadership.  Secondly, while females were less positive than males about the 
SNP leader, they nonetheless rated him more highly in absolute terms than any of the other 
politicians.  The implication is that, insofar as leadership can account for the gender gap in SNP 
voting, this is because Salmond won support from men rather than losing it amongst women.  
Thirdly, leadership evaluations may be causally posterior as well as prior to party choice: it could 
be that males preferred Alex Salmond because he led a party to which they were already 
particularly favourably disposed (for some of the reasons already considered).  In that case, 
differences in leadership evaluations are a by-product and not a cause of the gender gap under 
study here.  That possibility reinforces the need for a composite model with full multivariate 
controls, as built and analysed in the next section.  
 
 
2.3  Building a composite model 
 
Our composite model is based on the same variables, analysed in the same order, as in the 
previous section.  The only exception is political interest which is excluded given the compelling 
evidence that it is endogenous to party support.  The basic causal structure, beginning with fixed 
demographic characteristics and culminating in short-term factors like leadership evaluations, is 
well established and plausible.  Things are less clear-cut in the middle of the funnel of causality: 
reciprocal effects cannot be ruled out and different orders could be defended.  That said, the key 
decision – to introduce the ‘Scottish’ variables (national identity and constitutional preferences) 
before the more general issue and ideological variables – is justified by given the nature of the 
SNP and its support.  Since the focus of interest here is again the effect of gender on vote, we do 
not report the coefficients or odds ratios for the various control variables,11 but instead again 
track the changes in the odds ratio for gender and the implied gender gap.  The results are 
reported in Table 5 and illustrated in Figure 1, which shows opening and closing of the gender 
gap as successive batches of variables are added to the model. 
 
 
Table 3 
Effect of adding cumulative controls on the gender gap in SNP voting 
  
Variables added to cumulative model Odds ratio 
Implied 
(male/female SNP) gender gap 
None (baseline) 1.479 8.3 
Background   
Age and age-squared, religion, class 1.529 9.1 
Political engagement   
Education, newspaper readership 1.508 8.8 
                                                 
11 Full multivariate models of party choice in 2007 are reported by Johns et al. (2009). 
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National identity 1.730 11.6 
Constitutional preferences   
More powers for SP, fiscal powers for SP, 1.264 5.0 
view on referendum, view on independence 
Left-right issue positions/priorities   
Taxes and spending, top issue priority 1.253 4.8 
2007 issues   
Local taxation, Iraq, Trident 1.289 5.4 
Evaluation of Alex Salmond 1.168 3.3 
 
 
The broad pattern of results is that which would be expected given the analysis in the previous 
section.  However, the model-building approach here allows us to draw certain conclusions with 
more confidence.  First, demographic and socioeconomic variables are actually serving to narrow 
the gender gap slightly and so, when they are controlled, that gap opens out slightly.  It is not 
because males have different backgrounds and life experiences that they are particularly prone to 
vote SNP.  Nor is it because they feel more Scottish: again, controlling for national identity 
serves to widen the gender gap perceptibly.  The big shift in the graph is triggered by controlling 
for constitutional preferences.  Once again, then, the biggest single reason why men are more 
likely to vote for the SNP is because they are more likely to favour independence.  However, 
whereas at the bivariate level the effect of controlling for that variable was to eliminate the 
gender gap almost entirely, in this analysis a 5-point gap remains.  There are other factors at play 
in the gender-vote relationship.  The other most notable such factor is attitudes towards the 
SNP’s leader.  Controlling for those evaluations had the potential to reduce the gender gap quite 
substantially, even with an extensive series of prior variables held constant.   Alex Salmond’s 
particular popularity among men is not simply a consequence but also to some extent a cause of 
males’ positive attitudes towards his party.  The final point to note is that there remains a gender 
gap (albeit not a statistically significant difference) of around three percentage points even 
controlling for all of these other factors.  Given that this is around two-fifths of the size of the 
original gap, we can claim only partial success in our attempt to explain what it is about male 
voters that makes them more likely to support the SNP. 
 
 
Figure 1 
Changes in the gender gap with the addition of cumulative control variables 
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3. The gender gap in SNP membership 
 
The SNP’s difficulties in attracting support from women are mirrored – even magnified – when 
we turn from voters to party members.  As noted at the outset, only 31.8% of SNP membership 
survey respondents were women.  To some extent this reflects a tendency pervasive across time 
and across countries for party membership to be less common among women (REFS?).  
However, as Table 6 shows, the SNP has a remarkably low proportion of women by most 
yardsticks.  The results in the table suggest that there is a Scottish dimension to this under-
representation of women in party membership.  There is little comparable data on other parties in 
Scotland but, where sample sizes permit a meaningful comparison between a party’s 
membership in Scotland and in Britain as a whole, the proportion of women is always lower in 
the former case.  Nonetheless, the SNP figure is further from gender parity than any of the others 
– Scottish or British – in the table.  The purpose of this section is to account for that disparity, 
and specifically to assess whether it is driven by the same factors that proved important when we 
examined the electoral gender gap.  Having explored a parallel range of potential explanatory 
variables, we then look at responses to a question asking respondents directly why they joined 
the party. 
 
Table 4 
Sex breakdown of membership of different parties  
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  Year(s) of survey 
% women 
members 
Scottish members only   
SNP 2007/08 32 
Labour 1997 35 
Greens 1990 45 
Greens 2002 37 
   
All British members   
Labour 1989/90 39 
Labour 1997 39 
Conservative 1992 52 
Liberal Democrats 1993 47 
Liberal Democrats 1998/99 46 
Greens ?? 47 
 
 
 
3.1  Explaining the membership gender gap 
 
The empirical approach in this section is necessarily different.  The election study data included 
voters for all parties and thus allowed us to identify the factors determining whether or not voters 
chose the SNP.  By contrast, the membership survey does not include non-members (or members 
of other parties).  In considering the relationship between gender and SNP membership, then, we 
are confined to comparing male and female members of the party.  Any inferences drawn from 
such comparisons depend on the assumption of parallel gender differences among non-members.  
The previous section is therefore useful not only in highlighting the kinds of factors most likely 
to explain the gender gap in membership, but also because it provided some baseline information 
about the relationship between gender and key variables – like national identity and 
constitutional preferences – in the electorate as a whole.  Considered alone, the survey of SNP 
members is severely limited in what it can tell us about the determinants of membership.  
However, in conjunction with a (roughly contemporaneous) population survey, a detailed profile 
of male and female SNP members becomes more informative. 
 
We begin by looking at age among SNP members.  At 59 years, the average age of SNP 
members is quite high, making this – as in the previous section – an unpromising candidate for 
explaining the gender gap.  Demographic differences mean that, other things remaining the same, 
a more mature support is likely to be a disproportionately female support, and indeed the small 
gap between the mean female age (60.4) and mean male age (57.9) is similar in size to the 
corresponding gap in the overall population due to longer female life expectancy.  Hence the 
gender differences in the left-hand panel of Table 7 are predictable: the proportions of women 
are higher in the older age groups.  However, if we look only at recent recruits to the party – that 
is, those who joined since 2005 – then a more nuanced pattern emerges that cannot be ascribed 
solely to demographic patterns.  The first point to note is that, among recent joiners, the 
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proportion of females falls to just 28.2%.  The sharp increase in SNP membership has been 
achieved even more disproportionately among males.  Moreover, the party seems to have had 
particular difficulty in attracting younger women.  Females are especially underrepresented in 
the younger categories of new members, and overrepresented not in the oldest but in the older 
middle-aged categories.12  There is no obvious explanation for this pattern; what is clear is that it 
does not bode well for any imminent narrowing of the gender gap in membership. 
 
Table 5 
Sex of membership by age group 
 
 All members Joined since 2005 
 Women 
% 
Men 
% 
Women 
% 
Men 
% 
18-34 24.9 75.1 20.8 79.2 
35-44 26.5 73.5 24.0 76.0 
45-54 28.0 72.0 29.8 70.2 
55-64 34.6 65.4 33.3 66.7 
65-74 33.9 66.1 32.2 67.8 
75+ 35.6 64.4 28.5 71.5 
Total 31.0 69.0 28.2 71.8 
 
 
Another of the background variables considered earlier, religion, is on the face of it a more 
promising potential explanation for the gender gap in SNP membership.  In the population as a 
whole, as noted earlier, men are substantially less likely (by ten percentage points) to report a 
religious affiliation.  This could not account for the electoral gender gap because (at least in 
2007) there was no evidence that the SNP’s vote was particularly unreligious.  However, there is 
some such evidence with respect to the membership, where the proportion claiming a religious 
affiliation (57%) was noticeably lower than the corresponding proportion in the 2001 census in 
Scotland (67%).  Evidence from a religion by gender analysis of the membership is inconclusive.  
The gender difference in religious affiliations within the membership is exactly the same ten-
point gap as in the population.  This leaves open the possibility that greater religiousness among 
women (partly) explains their under-representation in the SNP.  But of course the converse could 
be true: it may be that the SNP membership is less religious because it contains fewer women.  
Unfortunately, our analyses cannot clarify causal direction so as to remove that ambiguity. 
 
In the electoral analysis we moved from background to political engagement variables.  For 
obvious reasons, the membership survey respondents were asked not about general interest in 
politics but about a range of activities and involvements within the party.  The gender gaps in 
this variables were typically modest.  Overall, 34% of men described themselves as ‘very’ or 
‘fairly’ active within the party, compared to 31% of women.   Men were slightly more likely to 
attend local party meetings regularly and markedly more likely to have stood for elected office 
                                                 
12 We do not report significance tests in this section of the paper.  With responses from around 7,000 members, 
almost any difference is significant; our concern is with substantive importance.  In any case, given that we were 
surveying the entire membership, the logic of inferential statistics (which assumes random sampling from a far 
greater population) does not really apply..  
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within the party.  On the other hand, they were less likely to have canvassed voters by telephone 
or to have attended the party’s national conference.  Once again, there are limits to the inferences 
that can be drawn from these comparisons.  Nevertheless, they give the impression that the SNP 
can call upon active members of both sexes.  Gender differences in involvement in the 
population can probably explain why most parties struggle to attract as many female as male 
joiners (see Table 6), but they seem unlikely to account for the SNP’s particularly wide gender 
gap in membership.  This conclusion is bolstered by the age profile of the party, which suggests 
that family commitments – an obvious reason why women might be less likely to join – are 
likely to have eased for many members.13   
 
Another possible reason for the membership gender gap is sex differences in levels of political 
efficacy.  This has two broad aspects: internal or self-efficacy, i.e. a feeling of being personally 
capable of participating, and external or collective efficacy, i.e. the belief that institutions and 
conditions allow that participation to make a difference.  Unsurprisingly, given the upbeat post-
election mood in the party, external efficacy scores were high among both men and women.  
This was true not only on general questions about the amount of influence wielded by members 
but also on a specific question about gender parity: hardly anyone of either sex (7% of women 
and 5% of men) agreed that ‘the party does not do enough to ensure that equal numbers of men 
and women are selected as SNP candidates’.  Again, then, it seems unlikely that women are put 
off from joining the party because they see no opportunity to make a contribution or to have a 
say.  However, there are signs – echoing previous findings from surveys of broader electorates 
(e.g. Vaus and McAllister, 1989) – that women members have a lower sense of internal political 
efficacy.  Women were rather less likely to agree that they ‘could have a real influence’ and 
markedly less likely to agree that they ‘could do a good job as an SNP councillor’.  The fact that 
these differences persist even among party members tends to arouse suspicions that they may 
also partly explain why women were less likely to join in the first place.  Again, though, it is 
unclear why this could explain the particular gender gap in the SNP’s membership. 
 
We therefore turn to the ‘Scottish’ variables that are the specific underpinnings of SNP support.  
As we have seen, there is little difference in terms of national identity between women and men 
in the electorate.  Table 8 shows that this is also true among members, less surprisingly in this 
case given the strong skew towards the Scottish end of the spectrum.  Given that men and 
women both inside and outside of the party are equally likely to feel Scottish, it seems highly 
unlikely that national identity can explain the gender gap in membership.  There is a potentially 
important caveat to this, however.  This standard measure of identity is relative rather than 
absolute: we know that men are no more likely to feel Scottish rather than British but these data 
leave open the possibility that they feel their Scottish identity more strongly.  We discuss this 
further in concluding the paper.   
 
Table 6 
National identity by sex among SNP members 
 
 Female 
(%) 
Male 
(%) 
Scottish not British 77.4 77.5 
                                                 
13 Only 7% of SNP members have children below the age of five under their care. 
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More Scottish than British 15.5 16.3 
Equally Scottish and British 2.4 2.6 
More British than Scottish 0.3 0.2 
British not Scottish 0.4 0.2 
Other  3.9 3.3 
 
 
As among the electorate, the results are very different when we turn from national identity to the 
constitutional question.  Just as female voters are markedly less radical in their constitutional 
preferences, so too are women members of the SNP, more than one in six of whom cited ‘further 
devolution short of independence’ as their preferred option.  Women were correspondingly less 
likely to endorse the SNP’s official policy of independence in the EU (though, interestingly, no 
less likely to favour the still more radical option of independence outside the EU).  The nine-
point gap in support for party policy is more or less identical in size to the corresponding gap 
within the electorate (whether we compare with the same five-option question as in Table 9 or 
with a simpler referendum vote intention question as discussed in the previous section).  It is also 
worth emphasising that, among both members and voters, those women who oppose 
independence do not instead tend to favour the status quo.  The ‘more powers’ option is the one 
that attracts a disproportionately female support.  We return to this point, too, at the end of the 
paper, in assessing likely reasons for the gender gap in constitutional preferences.  The interim 
conclusion is that differing appetites for independence look like a compelling explanation for the 
gender gap in SNP membership, just as they did for that same gap in electoral support.  
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Table 7 
Constitutional preferences by sex among SNP members 
 
 Female 
(%) 
Male 
(%) 
First constitutional preference   
Scotland should become independent outside the European Union 22.3 21.6 
Scotland should become independent within the EU 59.4 68.3 
The Scottish Parliament’s powers should be increased and it 
should raise more of its own taxes 
17.1 9.2 
There should be no change to the present arrangements: Scotland 
should have a devolved Parliament with limited powers 
1.0 0.5 
The Scottish Parliament should be abolished and all Scottish laws 
passed by Westminster again 
0.2 0.3 
 
 
Given the prominence of left-right ideology in previous explanations of partisan gender gaps, it 
is worth looking briefly at how male and female SNP members placed themselves and the party 
on a left-right scale.  A brief look is all that is required since these various placements hardly 
vary.  As with the average voter, the average member places the party slightly to the left of the 
centre of the scale, and there is no difference at all between men and women in this regard.  In 
terms of self-placements, women were marginally further left on the scale but only marginally 
(by less than one-tenth of a standard deviation), nowhere near enough to account for a large 
gender gap even if there were compelling evidence – which there is not – that left-right ideology 
is a prominent motivation for membership. 
 
The final variable to be considered here is leadership evaluations.  Earlier, we found evidence 
that Alex Salmond’s particular appeal to male voters goes some way to explaining the electoral 
gender gap.  It is more difficult to test for such a leadership effect on membership since members 
of both sexes are likely to evaluate their leader very positively anyway, particularly in the 
aftermath of the most successful election in the party’s history (a victory occasionally attributed 
to Salmond himself).  In this context, evidence that female SNP members were nonetheless more 
lukewarm in their endorsement of their leader would constitute persuasive (if still circumstantial) 
evidence that the leadership was deterring women from joining the party.  We can explore this 
via a series of questions asking members to rate a number of senior politicians – from both the 
SNP and other parties – on an 11-point like-dislike scale.  Table 10 first reports the mean ratings 
given by both male and female SNP members to Alex Salmond and Nicola Sturgeon, the leader 
and deputy leader and thus a prominent male and a female figure within the party.  There is no 
evidence that Salmond appealed particularly to men in the party, as his mean rating was actually 
slightly higher among females.  However, there is evidence that Nicola Sturgeon appealed less to 
men, who rated her on average more than half a point lower on the scale than did women 
(although 8.74 out of 10 is scarcely a denunciation).  Looking at respondents’ overall ratings of 
male and female SNP politicians confirms that Sturgeon rather than Salmond is the unusual case.  
Generally women members gave slightly higher ratings than men to politicians of both sexes, 
and that tendency – itself hardly marked – is more noticeable than any inclination among females 
to be particularly generous to female politicians.  Alex Salmond may struggle to win electoral 
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support amongst female voters but the evidence here, albeit indirect, suggests that he exerts no 
such deterrent effect on those already favourably enough disposed to the party to consider 
membership.  
 
Table 8 
Mean ratings of politicians by sex among SNP members 
 
 Mean (0-10) rating by sex of 
members 
Difference 
(female - male) 
 Male Female 
Alex Salmond 9.24 9.31 +0.07 
Nicola Sturgeon 8.74 9.31 +0.57 
All SNP politicians 
All males 8.12 8.30 +0.18 
All females 8.16 8.37 +0.21 
 
 
3.2  Self-reported motivations for joining 
 
The SNP membership survey included the following open-ended question: ‘Thinking back to 
your first decision to join the party, what were the main reasons that you JOINED the party?’  
Responses to the question were then coded into a large number of categories.  Multiple responses 
were possible but here we focus on the first reasons given.  These are reported, broken down by 
respondent sex, in Table 11.14    
 
                                                 
14 Although coding requires the enforcement of distinct categories, it is clear that there is substantial overlap or at 
least interrelationship between many of those listed in Table 11.  This is an unavoidable problem in the 
quantification of qualitative data and it means that the results should probably be regarded as indicative rather than 
precise.  Nonetheless, by the yardsticks of standard inter- and intra-coder tests, these codings are at least highly 
reliable.  
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Table 10 
Reported reasons for joining the SNP by respondent sex 
 
  
First given reason for joining 
Male 
(%) 
Female 
(%) 
Independence 47 39 
General liking for party 9 12 
Anti-union 7 6 
Further Scottish interests 6 6 
National identity/pride 5 5 
Dislike other parties 6 4 
Family/social links 3 8 
Participation 4 4 
Personal circumstances 2 3 
Past event/period 3 2 
Contacted by party 1 3 
Leaders 1 2 
Devolution 1 1 
Issues 1 1 
Other/unclear 4 4 
 
 
The results fully corroborate the story told so far about gender and SNP membership.  
Independence is by a very long way the most commonly cited reason for joining the party.  Not 
only are women (whether inside or outside the party) less likely to support independence but 
they are also less likely to be attracted to the party by that flagship policy.  Many of the null 
findings are also echoed in these data.  Expressions of national identity or pride were equally 
common among men and women, as were more general participatory motivations.  Leadership 
was mentioned by very few members anyway but certainly was not a particular motivation for 
male joiners.  Aside from the now-customary independence gap, the only other noteworthy 
gender difference is that women were much more likely to report social network reasons for 
joining, in particular family links with existing members (in several cases their partners).  This 
perhaps indicates that women require a stronger situational impetus to join political parties.  
However, this tends to explain the gender gap in membership of parties across the board.  When 
it comes to the particularly male profile of SNP membership, attitudes to independence again 
look the most plausible explanation. 
 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
Despite its history of prominent and senior female politicians, the Scottish National Party has 
generally polled better amongst men and has a disproportionately small proportion of females in 
its membership.  Previous speculation about the reasons for this has focused on two factors: first, 
fluctuations in the party’s commitment to and record on gender equality in representation; 
secondly on the party’s leadership.  We found some evidence that the gender gap in SNP 
electoral support in 2007 was partly due to the relative popularity of Alex Salmond among male 
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voters.  Hence it was probably not pure coincidence that, under John Swinney’s leadership in 
2003, a higher proportion of the SNP’s vote came from women than in previous and subsequent 
elections.  However, our analyses reveal a much more powerful explanation for the gender gaps 
in both electoral support and membership.  The cornerstone of SNP policy – and the party’s 
primary raison d’être – is Scottish independence.  Support for that option is a strong motivation 
both for its voters and its members.  And such support is markedly stronger among men than 
among women.  This goes a long way to solving the puzzle for this paper. 
 
Of course, this simply leads to another gender gap puzzle: why are there differences in support 
for independence?  Addressing this question is a further research task in itself.  Meanwhile, we 
will briefly outline three (out of many) possible answers.  The first refers back to a point noted 
about the measures of national identity used in this paper.  Previous studies have shown that 
feeling Scottish and not British is far from a sufficient condition for favouring independence 
(Brown et al., 1999; Denver et al., 2000; Paterson et al., 2001).  It seems quite likely that support 
for independence is driven as much by the intensity as by the direction of national identity, and 
men may feel their ‘Scottishness’ more intensely.  A second possibility lies in the gender 
differences in issue priorities also mentioned above.  Macroeconomics and foreign policy are 
probably the two most significant areas for which responsibility would be transferred to Scotland 
in the event of independence, and these are both more often the concern of men.  Since 
responsibilities for female priority issues, health and education, have already been devolved, 
women have in a sense less to gain from independence.  The third explanation is an application 
of the recurring finding in social psychology and (a little less consistently) microeconomics that 
men tend to be less risk-averse than women (Arch, 1993; Byrnes et al., 1999; Eckel and 
Grossman, 2003).  The extent of risk involved in Scottish independence is of course strongly 
disputed but, insofar as its impact is uncertain, there may be reason to expect women to be 
warier.  Adjudicating between these and other explanations will require detailed and tailored 
measures of the kind that were not available in the surveys used here.  Future research should 
take a comparative as well as a methodological direction.  In similar substantive contexts, the 
Scottish case has often been compared to several others, most often Quebec.   That and other 
cases offer survey data with which the relationship between gender, national identity and 
constitutional preferences can be further scrutinised. 
 
Our final point concerns framing.  Just as gender gaps in voting vary according to the way 
gender and related issues are presented and discussed at different elections, it seems probable 
that the gender gap in support for independence will depend on the framing of that policy in 
party and media discourse.  In other words, a greater appeal to men is not intrinsic to the 
policy of independence but is the result of the way that policy has been defined and 
discussed.  Further research into how and why independence proves less popular among 
women is therefore of more than academic interest.  It could guide the SNP – and, for that 
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matter, the parties opposed to independence – about how the issue can be framed to their 
maximum advantage.
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Appendix A: Data sources 
 
Scottish Election Study 
The 2007 Scottish Election Study (SES) was funded by the Economic and Social Research 
Council (RES-000-22-2256) and directed by two of the present authors (Mitchell and Johns) 
along with Professor David Denver of Lancaster University and Professor Charles Pattie of the 
University of Sheffield.  It involved a major panel survey of the Scottish electorate with data 
collected before and after the election on 3 May 2007.  The data were collected via the internet, 
fieldwork being undertaken by YouGov.  The initial sample was drawn from YouGov’s panel of 
subscribers resident in Scotland, and a response rate of 72% generated a pre-election sample of 
1,872 respondents.  This wave of data collection took place between 17 and 23 April.  Of the 
pre-election respondents, 83% also completed the post-election questionnaire, giving a panel 
sample size of 1,552 respondents.  The post-election data were collected between 4 and 10 May.  
The analyses presented here are based on data weighted (using YouGov’s standard weight) to 
make the achieved sample representative of the target sample in terms of a range of demographic 
and attitudinal variables including age, gender, social class, region, newspaper readership and 
past vote.  Further details, as well as an opportunity to read the questionnaires and to download 
the survey data, are available via the project website at www.scottishelectionstudy.org.uk. 
 
 
SNP membership survey 
This survey was also funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (RES-062-23-0722) 
as part of a wider study of the party.  It was directed by the present authors.  The target sample 
was the entire party membership which, as of 8 November 2007, stood at 13,203 members.  
Between 16 and 19 November, a questionnaire was sent to all of those members.  Following 
reminder postcards in early December, and a fresh mailing of questionnaires to non-respondents 
in mid-March 2008, the eventual achieved N was 7,112, a response rate of 53.9%.  (This is 
similar to those obtained in several of the other party membership studies in the UK.)  In the 
absence of reliable demographic information about the total party membership, we do not apply 
weights when analysing these data.  Further details are available at the study website 
http://www.strath.ac.uk/government/staff/mitchelljamesprofessor/snp/.   
 
 
